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If there is one thing about this essay that most satisfies me, it is that the process of 
writing it felt like a fitting conclusion to my undergraduate career.  In conceiving of my 
project, I wanted to draw out the issues that most challenged me over four years of study, 
and to try to interrogate them, side by side, one last time.  I want to say at the outset, then, 
that I believe each one of my extraordinary teachers at Columbia has contributed to this 
project.  There has been no greater intellectual pleasure over the last four years than 
discovering unforeseen connections between the different texts and problems that I had 
the opportunity to investigate with each of them. 
  
There are, of course, a few whom I must identify here individually.  Professor 
William Leach guided our seminar with great patience and taught me much about good 
historical writing.  In addition to serving as my second reader for this essay, Professor 
Casey Blake laid the groundwork for my exploration of American intellectual history.  
He introduced me to many of the figures who have most inspired—and at times, 
troubled—me in my study of the past, and with whom I hope to continue to engage long 
after the completion of this project.  I am grateful, as well, to Professor Ross Posnock, 
whose course pushed me to question the role of the thinker in American society, past and 
present.  Finally, I’d like to thank Professor Matthew Jones for challenging my 
assumptions about the history of ideas, and for contributing significantly to my 
understanding of the practice of history in general. 
  
My friends also deserve recognition for their contributions.  It has been a privilege 
to have so many curious, thoughtful, and provocative interlocutors with whom to share 
the last four years.  I want to thank them as well for giving me space when I needed to 
work, but more importantly, for always knowing how to fill the time when I didn’t. 
 
 Finally, I would like to thank my parents, who equipped me with the tools that 
enabled this project and made it fulfilling: they taught me to ask questions, and to be 
excited at the prospect of being challenged by the answers.   
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I. 
There was a certain moment, the writer Norman Podhoretz recalled, when the 
American intellectual gained access to the American Century.  Reflecting on a life 
spanning most of the twentieth century, and indeed most of the ideological battles that 
shaped it, Podhoretz identified the period following the Second World War as one that 
brought a pronounced shift in the way American intellectuals approached their country.  
“I was caught up in a new mood,” he wrote.  “America truly was a land being newly 
found or discovered; and the explorers in this instance were formerly ‘alienated’ writers 
and intellectuals.”1 
 To some extent, this memory served the particular autobiography Podhoretz 
sought to construct. Like other newly conservative intellectuals of his generation, he saw 
his ideological conversion as both a political and a spiritual turning point, marked by a 
patriotic and a broader intellectual awakening.  The newfound “American” territory 
Podhoretz described was one from which he and his cohort would never depart.2 
 At the same time, Podhoretz’s recollection was not solely defined—or 
corrupted—by his subsequent ideological turn to the right.  In his own memoir, the 
socialist literary critic Irving Howe came to a similar conclusion: that the postwar years                                                         
     1 Norman Podhoretz, My Love Affair With America: The Cautionary Tale of a Cheerful 
Conservative (New York: The Free Press, 2000), 116-117.   
     2 The “neoconservatives” of the 1950s and 1960s, Michael Kimmage tells us, looked to 
Whittaker Chambers’s Witness as a model for their own intellectual autobiographies.  For these 
writers, “politics had an autobiographical dimension, each autobiography a chapter in the 
collective conservative turn.”  Michael Kimmage, The Conservative Turn: Lionel Trilling, 
Whittaker Chambers, and the Lessons of Anti-Communism (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2009), 11.  Terry Cooney also warns us of the particular imposition of retrospective 
sources on the historiography of the New York Intellectuals, while still acknowledging their 
potential for “genuine vitality” and “intellectual seriousness.”  Terry Cooney, The Rise of the New 
York Intellectuals: Partisan Review and Its Circle (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1986), 4. 
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had fundamentally ruptured the intellectual culture in which he and his colleagues had 
taken part.  But unlike Podhoretz, Howe had recognized the danger of this shift and 
refused to have any part of it; it seemed that those who welcomed the sort of “discovery” 
which Podhoretz lauded were in default as intellectuals.  To succumb to the seduction of 
patriotism and conformity was, for Howe, incompatible with the responsibilities of 
intellectual life.  Indeed, he wrote, “the lines of separation that had defined intellectual 
life—lines between high and middlebrow, radical and acquiescent, serious and popular—
were becoming blurred.” If expressions of patriotic enthusiasm and concordance with 
national culture were the intellectual vogue, then it was Howe’s responsibility to resist 
them, to exercise the very duty to challenge consensus that he perceived to be 
threatened.3  
Despite their distinct ideological obligations, both Podhoretz and Howe had 
correctly identified a significant discourse of the postwar years, one which sought to 
interrogate what American society had to offer its intellectuals, and vice versa.4  Chief 
among the manifestations of this discourse was the Partisan Review symposium of 1952 
on “Our Country and Our Culture,” convened in order to “examine the apparent fact that 
American intellectuals now regard America and its institutions in a new way.”  A group 
of writers, critics, and professors assembled by the editors were asked for their                                                         
     3 Irving Howe, A Margin of Hope: An Intellectual Autobiography (London: Secker & 
Warburg, 1982), 170-172.   
     4 I am working off of a definition of “discourse” in intellectual history developed by David 
Hollinger, as “a social as well as an intellectual activity,” an “interaction between minds.”  
Hollinger writes that more important than shared “values, beliefs, perceptions, and concepts,” 
discourse is marked by shared questions.  I find this notion useful for looking at the engagement 
between intellectuals in a way that resists a “left-right” or “liberal-conservative” framework.  
David Hollinger, “Historians and the Discourse of Intellectuals,” in In the American Province: 
Studies in the History and Historiography of Ideas (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1985), 132. 
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assessment of what seemed the “apparent fact,” as well as for their concerns as to its 
implications.  What impact, for instance, would such a realignment have on the “tradition 
of critical non-conformism,” the intellectual’s impulse to scrutinize and dissent?  What 
connection was there between the behavior expected from an intellectual, and the 
political, social, or cultural character of his environment?5 
 What began then presumably as an evaluation of postwar American culture 
became in effect a contest over intellectual virtues, the commitments and responsibilities 
which not only distinguished an intellectual from the rest of society, but validated his 
place in it as well.  What did the words themselves mean—non-conformity, skepticism, 
dissent, alienation—and what use were they to a thinker in a society marked by the sense 
of triumph and complacency we have come to associate with the “fifties”?  In what ways 
might patriotism and economic security interact with or even undermine these virtues?  
 For some participants in this discourse, the crucial component of the presumed 
intellectual transformation—and that which it was most important for intellectuals to 
protect—was a new American freedom.  An individual liberty defined largely in 
opposition to the Soviet system was the marker of the kind of society that had now made 
room for its thinkers.6  And that society, so the narrative went, as the model and protector 
both of liberal political values and Western intellectual traditions, was one which 
                                                        
     5 “Editorial Statement,” in American and the Intellectuals (New York: Partisan Review, 1953), 
1-5.  The essays published in this volume are reprinted from the original symposium, which was 
published over several issues of the magazine in 1952, under the title “Our Country and Our 
Culture.”  Thus, all further citations of this volume will refer simply to “Our Country and Our 
Culture.” 
     6 Even as I make this claim, I should note that I believe it is important to consciously avoid 
reading the Cold War as the overriding context for the “Our Country and Our Culture” 
symposium, and for the discourse I am examining as a whole.  In this respect, I follow Martin 
Halliwell, American Culture in the 1950s (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 5-7.   
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intellectuals should embrace.  The conception of progress behind this liberal intellectual 
scheme was rather simple: as the political and material conditions of society improved, so 
too would the conditions of the intellectual life.   
 There was, by contrast, a more radical approach to the question of the postwar 
cultural reassessment.  Critics of the terms of the 1952 symposium, Irving Howe chief 
among them, argued that the dissent of the individual artist or writer was the critical 
intellectual virtue to be upheld, regardless of the character of the American political or 
cultural landscape.  It was not the job of the intellectuals, these critics argued, to applaud 
the society which sought to include them, but rather to help create one which they 
themselves sought, one which would still permit them their roles as critics, skeptics, and 
where necessary, dissenters.  The idea that America itself could be the “basis of strength, 
renewal, and recognition” was, to this group, misguided.  Such support was to be found, 
the sociologist C. Wright Mills wrote, in individual consciousness or broad intellectual 
traditions, and not in national identification.7 
 It might seem, then, that the radical critique of the intellectual reconciliation with 
American culture was based on an essential rather than a contingent definition of 
intellectuals.  In other words, whereas the liberal conception of the intellectual seemed to 
adapt to the progress of American political life, the radical conception saw the 
intellectual’s role as fixed: the true intellectual, as dissenter, was perpetually distant from 
political consensus and power.  However, we should not allow such a reading to obscure 
what radicals themselves understood to be the positive value of dissent, its ability to drive 
progressive change.  That conception was in many ways consistent with the basic                                                         
     7 C. Wright Mills, “Our Country and Our Culture,” 76. 
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assumptions of earlier generations as well, who believed that the intellectual was in fact 
central to the work of national progress.  In the first decades of the twentieth century, 
those whom the historian Steven Biel calls “independent intellectuals” disengaged from 
institutions in large part to ensure a stronger public impact.8  Even for Randolph Bourne, 
the intellectual failure of the pro-war liberals stemmed not from their essential 
assumption of the power of intellectual action, but rather from the notion that such 
potential could be realized through a project like the First World War.  Indeed, the War 
was, in Bourne’s eyes, precisely the impediment to free thought and criticism, the tools 
which supported the young intellectual’s ability to contribute to American democracy.9    
The following generation went even further, I would argue, in its confidence in 
the link between intellectual production and social betterment.  In the 1930s, many 
radical writers came to view an alliance between intellectuals and the working class as 
the crucial force of revolutionary change.  However, implicit in this new engagement was 
a puzzling contradiction: if the working class was, as Waldo Frank put it, “the chief 
instrument” for bringing about a new American order, then what need was there for the 
participation of the intellectuals?  There was, therefore, a certain audacity behind the 
premise that intellectuals mattered to a great degree; on this count Frank himself was 
                                                        
     8 Steven Biel, Independent Intellectuals in the United States, 1910-1945 (New York: New 
York University Press, 1992). 
     9 I am reminded here in particular of the comment Bourne made in his final letter to his 
mother, tragic for its proximity to his death less than one month later: “Now that the war is over 
people can speak freely again and we can dare to think.  It’s like coming out of a nightmare.”  
Bourne to Sarah Bourne, New York, 21 November 1918, in The Letters of Randolph Bourne: A 
Comprehensive Edition, ed. Eric J. Sandeen (Troy, NY: The Whitson Publishing Company, 
1981), 425.   
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guilty, perhaps increasingly so as he perceived the stakes of history being raised and the 
need for upheaval intensified.10  
The recollection of this history in the context of the 1950s debate shows us that 
dissent did not by any means necessitate isolation or alienation.  On the contrary; the 
defense of dissent rested on the claim that intellectual non-conformity was not only a 
virtue for the individual thinker, but was in fact a good for society, a means of effecting 
progress.  Even the novelist Norman Mailer, who in 1955 extolled some of the very same 
conditions—“despair, isolation, contraction and spiritual exile,” in his words—that his 
contemporary proponents of the new intellectual “comfort” deemed obsolete, seemed to 
value such conditions principally as progressive historical forces.  “Only when the artist 
is ready to accept” those circumstances, Mailer wrote, carrying the argument for the 
writer’s historical agency even further than had Frank in the 1930s, “can he be able to 
find the expansive energies and the unrestrained enthusiasm which continue the essential 
dialectic of human progress.”11 
 Despite the certainty of such rhetoric, the confidence expressed by some radicals 
in the positive value of dissent, we should acknowledge what seems to some degree the 
defensive nature of the radical posture.  The position staked out by Howe, for example, in                                                         
     10 Quoted in Daniel Aaron, Writers on the Left: Episodes in American Literary Communism 
(1961; repr., New York: Columbia University, 1992), 193.  In his foreword to the published 
edition of the proceedings of the 1935 American Writers’ Congress, Frank wrote that despite their 
ideological deviations, members of the Congress were “held together by common devotion to the 
need of building a new world from which the evils endangering mankind will have been 
uprooted, and in which the foundations will live for the creating of a universal human culture.”  
Naturally, the gains made amongst intellectuals would be spread to others: “The real fruit of this 
gathering of creative American forces will live, invisibly yet fatefully, in the works of hundreds 
of American writers and, through them, in the living experience of the American people.”  Waldo 
Frank, “Foreword,” in American Writers’ Congress, ed. Henry Hart (New York: International 
Publishers, 1935), v.  Italics mine. 
     11 Norman Mailer, “What I Think of Artistic Freedom,” Dissent 2, no. 2 (1955): 192. 
  9 
the 1952 symposium and beyond was not simply a reassertion of a timeless truth about 
intellectual virtue, but was in fact an attempt to respond to a worrisome American scene.  
In other words, for Howe and others who regarded critical dissent as part and parcel of 
being an intellectual, the proposition that intellectuals were and should be comfortable, 
secure, and integrated in postwar America was deeply unsettling.  The notion of stability 
and of intellectual security in the absence of crisis thereby provoked a kind of crisis in 
and of itself.   
 What’s more, for many intellectuals (radical or otherwise), there was a real value 
to a climate of crisis as opposed to one of stability.  As many had believed they learned 
from the period of Depression and World War, the need to act, to respond to external 
events, could provide an opening for intellectuals, an opportunity to effect change and 
even propel the movement of history.  The absence of such crisis, then, or perhaps even 
the suggestion of its absence, could thus reasonably cause intellectuals to worry about 
their own marginalization.  Without an outlet for action, how was an intellectual to 
distinguish himself in society? 
 There is, at the same time, a parallel question for historians, as to what role we 
ought to assign moments of crisis in the narrative of intellectual history.  Should 
intellectual history be the story of a series of crises, and the various attempts by 
intellectuals to respond to such historical moments?  It is my hope that my examination 
of the crisis of intellectual virtues and self-definition in the 1950s can inspire further 
consideration of this larger historiographical question.12 
                                                        
     12 Richard Pells, for one, writes that his own book is “about the way certain American writers 
in the 1940s and 1950s interpreted and tried to cope with the major events of their time.”  Richard 
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 Of course, I do not mean to suggest that the period in question was devoid of 
political or social crisis, or of the potential for a sense of interaction with history that had 
so energized previous generations of intellectuals.  The course of world events at that 
time is clear enough; American intellectuals were not somehow immune to the exigencies 
of the Cold War, nor, as Richard Pells points out, were they necessarily prepared for 
them.13  But while these events did intervene in the discourse of intellectual virtues, they 
did not create it.  The issues posed by the Partisan Review symposium and its 
respondents existed as problems for intellectuals prior to the 1950s, and the answers to 
them were not formed solely in response to new external pressures.  What’s more, the 
liberal and radical camps I have mentioned often seemed to assess the status of the 
intellectual against two fundamentally different contexts: for the liberals, the defense of 
American freedom proceeded primarily against external threats, while the radicals sought 
to preserve the virtue of dissent in the face of largely internal societal forces.14  In the 
case of both groups, above all, the discourse was characterized by the interaction of fixed 
assumptions with historical contingencies, by the need to refashion previous conceptions 
of intellectual virtue to meet the particular needs of intellectuals in the 1950s.      
 So too, I contend, were these intellectuals moved by a need to reassert their own 
social legitimacy in a society which, for various reasons, some of them suggested by the                                                         
Pells, The Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age: American Intellectuals in the 1940s and 1950s 
(Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1989), vii.  
     13 Pells, The Liberal Mind, viii. 
     14 A more convenient way of phrasing this difference would be to say that if the liberals 
operated in a Cold War context, the radicals operated in a Postwar one.  I should also note, here, 
that I do not assume that such a thing as a monolithic “Cold War culture” existed during this 
period to begin with.  See Peter J. Kuznick and James Gilbert, ed., Rethinking Cold War Culture 
(Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001), especially the contributions of Kuznick and 
Gilbert, “U.S. Culture and the Cold War,” 1-13, and Alan Brinkley, “The Illusion of Unity in 
Cold War Culture,” 61-73. 
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1952 symposium, might no longer find them useful as a distinct class of thinkers, if 
indeed it had at all before.  We might call this concern the anxiety of irrelevance; it 
informed intellectuals’ approaches to the presumed reconciliation with American culture 
and their formulations of intellectual virtue more broadly. 
 The various responses to this problem of irrelevance also highlight a deeper issue 
at stake in the contest of intellectual virtues.  Implicit in the interrogation of the “new” 
role of the American intellectual was the question of power; specifically, was proximity 
to or the service of power suitable for someone calling himself an intellectual at all?  To 
answer affirmatively in some sense followed logically from the liberal notion of 
integration, that is, of the convergence of individual intellectual and national interests as 
an enabling trend rather than a stifling one.  Even if the liberals did not anticipate the 
gradual elimination of intellectuals in American culture, they may, like progressives of 
the early twentieth century, have accepted and even welcomed the absorption of the 
intellectual class into a larger technocracy.  To that end, the realities of bureaucratization  
and institutionalization—particularly as manifested in the expansion of the American 
academy—were, as Russell Jacoby notes, significant sources of anxiety for those 
intellectuals who condemned the new conformity.15 
 This question too, of the suitability of aligning intellect with power, was not 
unique to the 1950s.  Indeed, it is important to consider the degree of continuity between 
assumptions about intellectual empowerment, authority, and command of events                                                         
     15 Many of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Progressives placed their hopes in a 
professional managerial class of experts; one notable expression of this kind of thinking was 
Walter Lippmann, Drift and Mastery: An Attempt to Diagnose the Current Unrest (New York: 
Mitchell Kennerley, 1914); Russell Jacoby, The Last Intellectuals: American Culture in the Age 
of Academe (New York: Basic Books, 1987), 72-73.  For the critique of the professional classes, 
see in particular the work of C. Wright Mills in this period. 
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throughout the different challenges which intellectuals faced in the twentieth century. 
Such a view can help us observe what I believe is the new significance that the question 
of power takes on in the history of the postwar period.  Though intellectuals were not 
pervasive in federal administration during the 1950s, by the next decade the employment 
of social scientific “expertise” was prevalent.16  Moreover, the stories of the contest of 
intellectual virtues and the ideological adjustments among the New York Intellectuals 
during the Cold War are unquestionably linked.  While it is difficult to fully define what 
we have come to call neo-conservatism as a set of political and social beliefs, there is at 
least one historical point about it that we may reasonably make: that neo-conservative 
politics, particularly in the past several decades, has been marked precisely by its exercise 
in power at the highest levels of American government.  It is my hope, therefore, that by 
highlighting the problem of power in the postwar discourse, I may be able to sharpen our 
understanding of the historical emergence and the assumptions of neo-conservatism.  Not 
only does such a task matter for those of us who have been deeply troubled precisely by 
the political projects of neo-conservatives, but it may ultimately help validate the radical 
insistence on dissent and skepticism of the intellectual service of power in general.  
Finally, it remains for me to address two potential objections to the premise of my 
work.  First, some will argue that the set of writers and thinkers I have chosen to study is 
too parochial, given that the group associated with periodicals such as Partisan Review, 
Dissent, and Commentary were all essentially what we have come to call “New York 
Intellectuals.”  While I acknowledge the locality of this group, and the limitations that it                                                         
     16 For more on this political development, see Howard Brick, Age of Contradiction: American 
Thought and Culture in the 1960s (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1998) and Bruce Kuklick, 
Blind Oracles: Intellectuals and War from Kennan to Kissinger (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2006). 
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could conceivably impose, I nevertheless do not choose to study it because of any 
mystical authority lent by its very name.  Rather, I see this group of individuals as those 
who most explicitly, most passionately, and most prolifically engaged with the issues of 
intellectual virtue, self-definition, and self-justification in this period.  So too were they 
the ones most directly influenced—both inspired and haunted—by the experience of the 
generation which preceded them.  Put more simply, and to return to David Hollinger’s 
definition, what these writers had in common was a preoccupation with certain 
questions.17  
 The second and more fundamental of the objections I face as I set out is the 
challenge: Why “intellectuals?”  What bearing do the ideas of an elite class have on the 
experience of most other people?  Rather than claiming to possess the definitive response 
to this challenge, I submit that it is precisely this question that my study takes most 
seriously.  Whether or not the ideas of these intellectuals have any import for the history 
of their period or our own can be fairly questioned; however, there can be no doubt that 
these individuals, to varying degrees, believed that their ideas mattered, and that their 
lives were not solipsistic but instead could be valuable and relevant to their fellow 
citizens—and we should try to understand why.  To examine the arguments over the 
meaning of the term “intellectual” is concurrently to consider the term’s worth.  At the 
very least, we know that intellectuals tend to speak loudly, and to speak often; when they 




     17 Hollinger, “Historians and the Discourse of Intellectuals,” 132.   
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II. 
 Lionel Trilling, diagnostician of postwar liberalism and Partisan Review stalwart, 
saw the history of the twentieth-century “American intellectual class” as one defined by 
crisis.  The 1930s, Trilling contended, or more accurately the era of upheaval that became 
known as the “thirties,” had established the concerns and formed the political makeup of 
the intellectual class that endured through the subsequent decades.  It was not merely a 
sustained political tradition, however, that Trilling traced to the Depression generation, 
but a style of intellectual activity as well: what he deemed “the moral urgency, the sense 
of crisis, and the concern with personal salvation” that sprung from the radical politics of 
the intellectuals and would characterize their action from that point on.18  
 Trilling’s sketch was an imperfect one, at least for its simplification of history.  
Trilling’s equation of radicalism with intellect excluded political (and geographic) 
outliers—such as the conservative critics of capitalism—from the intellectual narrative of 
the Depression generation.  By the same token, Trilling obscured the historical 
significance of New Deal liberalism for the intellectual life of the period as well as the 
decades that followed.19      
 What Trilling seemed to capture far better than the politics of the radical period 
was its intellectual mood, with the “moral urgency” and “sense of crisis” being the 
                                                        
     18 Lionel Trilling, “A Novel of the Thirties,” quoted in Hilton Kramer, The Twilight of the 
Intellectuals: Culture and Politics in the Era of the Cold War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1999), xi. 
     19 Malcolm Cowley’s memoir of the 1930s seems to acknowledge, in retrospect, the 
disconnect between this fact of history and the oppositional certainty of the radical (especially 
Communist) left at the time.  See Malcolm Cowley, The Dream of the Golden Mountains: 
Remembering the 1930s (New York: The Viking Press, 1980), 218.  For more on the debates over 
association with FDR and the New Deal, see Richard Pells, The Liberal Mind in a Conservative 
Age: American Intellectuals in the 1940s and 1950s (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1989), 
22-23. 
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operative occupational concerns of the intellectuals themselves.  In a sense, Trilling was 
making the argument that the intellectual history of the thirties (and implicitly, of his 
contemporary moment) was defined not so much by the answers to particular political 
questions, but by the set of resources and practices used to formulate them.20  
 There is no question, moreover, that the memory of the thirties had profound 
effects on the intellectual culture of the postwar years.  Not only did the engagement with 
Communism inform the Cold War politics of countless intellectuals of the 1950s, but the 
experience of crisis during the Depression later shaped the discourse of intellectual 
virtues itself.  Many of the leading contributors to that discourse literally came of age 
during the thirties, and their conceptions of the power of radical action were forged in it.  
Those on the left in particular came to feel, as Irving Howe wrote, as though they had a 
“privileged relationship to history.”  The “dramatic” tendency in the Marxist view of 
history, Howe commented on behalf of his generation, “made each moment of our 
participation seem so rich with historical meaning.”21 
 “Participation” was the operative word; radical politics did not just instill in the 
intellectuals a sense of the rush of history, but also a profound sense of their own ability 
to shape or even command it.  Howe, too, perceived a certain radical intellectual “style” 
as the distinguishing marker of this (his own) new generation, one owing to the particular 
context of the thirties: “a flair for polemic, a taste for the grand generalization, an 
                                                        
     20 Irving Howe made a similar move in a 1968 essay in which he wrote the following of the 
radicalism of New York Intellectuals in the thirties: “From a doctrine it became a style, and from 
a style a memory.”  Irving Howe, “The New York Intellectuals,” reprinted in Selected Writings 
1950-1990 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990), 244.   
     21 Irving Howe, “New York in the Thirties: Some Fragments of Memory,” Dissent 8, no. 3 
(1961), reprinted in The New York Intellectuals Reader, ed. Neil Jumonville (New York: 
Routledge, 2007), 32. 
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impatience with what they regarded (often parochially) as parochial scholarship, an 
internationalist perspective, and a tacit belief in the unity—even if a unity beyond 
immediate reach—of intellectual work.”22 
 If these discoveries about the occupational virtues of being an intellectual were in 
fact as powerful as Howe depicts them, it would help explain the reach of the radical 
style even among those who were not explicitly political intellectuals.23  Indeed, it is hard 
to discount the allure of the period of activity that Howe describes.  The “intensity and 
fervor, a reality or illusion of engagement, a youth tensed with conviction,” that so 
absorbed Howe’s comrades, was just as much an intellectual opportunity as it was a 
historical condition.  Understanding the formative environment of the 1930s in this way 
should help us recognize the staying power of the sense of crisis and historical certainty 
even after the exigencies of the Depression (and later the War) had passed.24 
 Still, as natural as it may be to look solely to the Depression generation to 
illuminate the intellectual experience of the 1950s, we do so at the risk of obscuring other 
critical moments in which notions of influence, power, and certainty were tested among 
intellectuals.  To be sure, even the tumultuous contests of the thirties did not emerge 
wholly independent of previous debates, nor did those thinkers who came of age in that 
decade break entirely from the past and their own radical predecessors.   
                                                        
     22 Howe, “The New York Intellectuals,” in Selected Writings, 244. 
     23 Alfred Kazin is one example of a New York intellectual who distanced himself from 
politics.  But even as he tried to subordinate radical doctrines to his own intellectual craft (literary 
criticism), Kazin (who, for instance, did not contribute to the “Our Country and Our Culture” 
symposium of 1952), could not help but get caught up in the spirit of historical urgency of his 
peers.  See Alfred Kazin, Starting Out in the Thirties (New York: Vintage Books, 1980), 3-25.  
     24 Howe, “The New York Intellectuals,” 244. 
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 The setting of the First World War and the liberal intellectual flirtation with 
power during it is, for our purposes, one of the most illustrative of such historical 
examples.  Of course, the intellectual responses to the European conflict and American 
intervention in it have already been well charted in historical literature, as has the 
interaction between intellect and power brought on by the war.  It is not my intention 
here, therefore, to re-tell that story, but rather to highlight certain threads within it which 
can be of use in understanding the period that followed.  By examining the commitments 
and motivations of those intellectuals who found themselves absorbed in, and eventually 
to some degree, betrayed by, the experience of power, we can consider the degree to 
which the contests to of intellectual virtues in later generations were not so much 
articulations of new crises but rather reformulations of old ones.   
 In his discussion of the origins of what he calls the “new radicalism,” Christopher 
Lasch links the development of American intellectual culture with broader political 
trends taking shape at the turn of the twentieth century.  The emergence of the new kind 
of intellectual, Lasch argues, was related to but not wholly dependent on the fate of the 
progressive movement.  The development of expansive federal power, along with a “new 
readiness” to use that power and a turn towards scientific and pragmatic methods in doing 
so were among those strands of a “progressive” political climate which Lasch finds 
related to but not in control of the new radicalism.  Even more important than these 
trends, he writes, was the “confusion of politics and culture” (a move beyond the political 
reform of the Progressive movement), which supported the notion that “men of learning 
  18 
occupy or ought to occupy the strategic loci of social control,” and which therefore had 
“an obvious appeal to intellectuals.”25 
 It was this impulse to control that I would argue was not only most apparent at the 
moment of the World War, but also which continued to challenge intellectuals during the 
Depression crisis and in the postwar years.  And a central manifestation of that impulse, 
at least in the first decades of the twentieth century, was the assumption that the 
mobilization of intellect, on behalf of the state if necessary, could be a crucial gesture 
towards national progress.  That assumption was implicit in the hopeful progressivism of 
someone like Herbert Croly, whose aim to recapture the “Promise of American Life” was 
not based on a whiggish dream of certain historical progress, but rather on the need for 
individuals (and the collective society) to take control of history, and to seize such 
progress for themselves.26   
 This premise should account, to some degree, for Croly’s establishment of The 
New Republic in 1914 as an engine for social change, not just a forum for intellectual 
articulation.  Above all, writes Lasch, the journal “was to stand for mastery,” the term put 
forth by Croly’s collaborator Walter Lippmann as the desired end of politics in his 
influential book of the previous year.  Mastery was not necessarily a new concept, but it 
could be achieved with a new degree of success given modern conditions and scientific 
capacities.  Indeed, the “scientific spirit,” wrote Lippmann, was the very “discipline of 
                                                        
     25 Christopher Lasch, The New Radicalism in America, 1889-1963: The Intellectual as a 
Social Type (1965; repr., New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1986), xiii-xiv. 
     26 Herbert Croly, The Promise of American Life (1909; repr., New York: Capricorn Books, 
1964), 5.  David Levy has argued for an understanding of this text that refines the force of 
progressivism as the primary influence on its production.  David W. Levy, Herbert Croly of the 
New Republic: The Life and Thought of an American Progressive (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1985), 131. 
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democracy, the escape from drift, the outlook of a free man.”  With the proper infusion of 
expertise into state power, it seemed, the full potential of a modern democratic society 
could be realized for a much wider and more equitable constituency.27 
 There was a sense, then, and not exclusively among liberals, that the promise of 
American life and the promise of intellectual life were fundamentally linked.  Still, the 
liberal-progressive emphasis on the pragmatic mode of reform seemed to belie more 
traditional notions of intellectual practice.  That is to say, at least, that Lippmann’s 
promotion of the “scientific spirit” and technocratic authority—somewhat ironic given 
than Lippmann was himself no scientist but rather a theorist—offered an image of a more 
active intellectual, a thinker involved in meeting the challenges of his society instead of 
confining himself to solitary thought and writing.  Thus the gesture towards the 
incorporation of intellectuals into positions of political power was, to some degree, a turn 
away from the concurrent move towards independence and extrication from institutions.  
It was, however, in line with the broader trends which Robert Wiebe suggests were 
central to the emergence of modern American society leading up to the First World War: 
the convergence of the centralization of state authority and the bureaucratization of 
society, the increasing incorporation of experts as a means of management.28 
 While we should acknowledge this process of incorporation as just that—a 
process of change over time—the experience of the war stands out as a definitive moment 
in our historical imagination, as it did in the intellectuals’ own memory of the twentieth 
                                                        
     27 Lasch, The New Radicalism, 183; Walter Lippmann, Drift and Mastery: An Attempt to 
Diagnose the Current Unrest (New York: Mitchell Kennerley, 1914), 269, 276. 
     28 See Steven Biel, Independent Intellectuals in the United States, 1910-1945 (New York: New 
York University Press, 1992); Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 1967). 
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century.29  More than an entanglement with power, the war was in retrospect a test of the 
notion that power and intellect could be aligned.  So too did it challenge the authenticity 
and compatibility of various impulses among engaged intellectuals.  While the conflict 
between aggressive nationalism and reluctant pacifism was the political battle on the 
surface between the war liberals and war critics, it was the deeper test of intellectual 
assumptions—about the movement of history, the possibility of progress, and the 
intellectual potency in controlling both—that, for our purposes, marks the story of the 
war and the intellectuals.30 
 It is useful to keep this larger conflict in mind when we recall that the association 
of liberals (particularly those in the New Republic circle) with the Wilson 
administration’s war aims was by no means inevitable.  Though the New Republic 
established itself close (geographically and intellectually) to political power, it is unlikely 
that its editors conceived of that relationship coming to bear on military or diplomatic 
matters.  Foreign conflicts, to be sure, tend to inconvenience the course of domestic 
social reform, and it therefore took a degree of intellectual manipulation to align the goals 
of liberalism at home with what was quickly deemed to be liberalism abroad.  In other 
words, the war was adopted ex post facto as a liberal project, but did not follow logically 
from the liberal pragmatist framework under which the New Republic, for one, had 
previously presumed to operate.  Nor, in entering into this kind of association with 
government, did the liberals seem to recognize the distinction between the limited 
                                                        
     29 Lasch, for one, writes that the war “left [American radicalism] with wounds from which it 
never entirely recovered.”  Lasch, The New Radicalism, 182. 
     30 For more on the ways in which the war debate was infused with broader self-reflection on 
the social role of the intellectual, see Biel, Independent Intellectuals, 62-63. 
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application of expertise and a broader acceptance of intellectual influence on political 
power.31 
 Moreover, even before the United States entered the war, the editors of the New 
Republic seemed concerned as to the implications for intellectual potency that the conflict 
would have.  The journal’s position, Lasch contends, “rested less on a critical analysis of 
the issues involved than on a powerful emotional abhorrence of neutrality in all its forms, 
at the national and the personal level alike.”  This “fear of neutrality, of political 
impotence,” Lasch continues, “was the key to the contradictions in which The New 
Republic so often found itself entangled.”  So too did it govern the journal’s critique of 
the so-called “passivism,” the refusal of dissenters to take an active position, to 
acknowledge the possibility of positive pragmatic change through war.32 
 It was this plank of the liberals’ position which the young cultural critic Randolph 
Bourne identified in his critique of the move to support the war, and the deconstruction of 
it amplified his case against American intervention.  Not only was the support of 
intervention a misguided political position in Bourne’s eyes, but the adoption of the war 
as a liberal project was the worst kind of intellectual overreach, wherein The New 
Republic and its circle had subordinated the appreciation of pragmatic reality to the 
pursuit of action, certainty, and control.  Bourne was highly conscious of the problems 
                                                        
     31 Lasch, The New Radicalism, 190-191.  On the intellectuals’ miscalculation of their own 
influence, Robert Wiebe writes: “But the specialist who attempted to move beyond his sphere 
almost always fell from grace.  Such men as Herbert Croly and Walter Lippmann, hoping that 
Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson would seek ‘experts’ in political philosophy, only 
suffered frustration.  In the realm of broad policy, each political leader was his own expert.” 
Wiebe, The Search for Order, 197.  It may be of interest that Lippmann, for one, retained a great 
deal of influence in later years as a journalist and opinion-maker.  For his full biography, see 
Ronald Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century (Boston: Little Brown, 1980).   
     32 Lasch, The New Radicalism, 191-192. 
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these impulses posed to the life of the mind, and that consciousness informed (and lent 
authority to) his wartime commentary. 
 Though it was sharpened by the war, Bourne’s assessment of the intellectual’s 
social role—specifically, of his capacity for political influence—had begun to form in 
significant ways prior to the conflict and the battle of ideas it brought.  Steven Biel places 
Bourne’s model of intellectual life squarely within the larger trend towards the 
independence of “freelance” activity in the early twentieth century.  “In the minds of 
Bourne and his contemporaries,” Biel writes, “the removal from the academic ivory 
tower did not destroy the educational function of thinkers and writers.”  Rather, that 
move expanded the intellectual’s “potential for persuasive influence,” precisely by 
widening the audience for (and thereby further democratizing) the fruits of the intellect.33 
 There should be little doubt, then, that Bourne himself sought to increase the 
avenues for intellectual action, based on a fundamental belief in the potential for what he 
called the “creative desire” (particularly on the part of young thinkers) to revitalize 
American democracy.34  However, Bourne did not seek to realize that impulse within the 
context of political or institutional power.  Quite the contrary, he sought to highlight the 
distinction between the mobilization of expertise by the state and the contemplative 
exercise of intellect that could itself still be deployed for pragmatic purposes.  Still in 
many respects committed to the teachings of William James, Bourne could accept neither 
the overwhelming scope of war as an intellectual project (what James might call its                                                         
     33 Biel, Independent Intellectuals, 57. 
     34 Casey Blake has argued for a reading of Bourne and his “Young American” peers which 
emphasizes their commitment to “a communitarian vision of self-realization through participation 
in a democratic culture.”  Casey Nelson Blake, Beloved Community: The Cultural Criticism of 
Randolph Bourne, Van Wyck Brooks, Waldo Frank, and Lewis Mumford (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1990), 2. 
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“bigness”) nor the cooptation of what he called the “gay passion of ideas” on its behalf.  
If anything, the Jamesian spirit (and indeed the very call of the engaged intellectual) 
instructed the thinker to doubt rather than accept, to unsettle rather than affirm.35        
 Accordingly, Bourne’s attack on the war intellectuals targeted their fundamental 
naïveté: they had allowed themselves to be manipulated by the Wilson administration by 
succumbing to a complacent overconfidence in the power of their own action.  Put 
another way, Wilson’s overtures to the intellectuals exploited their exaggerated sense of 
agency, their belief “that it was they who effectively willed” the war. The liberals were 
governed by an instinct shared by intellectuals of all persuasions, Bourne suggested: the 
“craving for action” which led thinkers to seek outlets not just for thought or expression, 
but also for practice. 36  For the liberals, the crisis had to be converted into an 
opportunity; in their urge to seize the moment of crisis, though they failed to see that war, 
more than any other outlet they could have chosen, could not be controlled.  What’s 
more, by overlooking (or worse, denying) the inexorable nature of war in the hope that it 
could lead to ends other than its own, the intellectuals had jeopardized the instrument 
which Bourne believed could in fact spearhead real change: the creative potential of the 
young intellectual.  Progress may have depended in part on the ability of young 
intellectuals to harness opportunities for action, but the war was not such an opportunity.  
                                                        
     35 Randolph S. Bourne, “Twilight of Idols,” in War and the Intellectuals: Collected Essays, 
1915-1919, ed. Carl Resek (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1999), 64.  For more on Williams James’ 
public commitments, see George Cotkin, William James, Public Philosopher (Champaign: 
University of Illinois Press, 1994).  On the question of unsettling received wisdom, Edward Said 
asserts that: “Least of all should an intellectual be there to make his/her audiences feel good: the 
whole point is to be embarrassing, contrary, even unpleasant.”  Edward Said, Representations of 
the Intellectual (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 12.  
     36 Bourne, “The War and the Intellectuals,” in War and the Intellectuals, 3, 11. 
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Rather, the very persistence of the war, Bourne wrote in July of 1917, might destroy “the 
only genuinely precious thing in a nation, the hope and ardent idealism of its youth.”37    
 As damning as Bourne’s critique was and continues to be, embedded within it was 
a surprising note of sympathy.  That is, we cannot help but acknowledge Bourne’s 
recognition of the spiritual strivings of the liberal intellectuals, the degree to which they 
were victims of impulses to which he too might have given in.  In the case of the war, the 
liberals’ “craving for action” had come into conflict with Bourne’s own.  It was his 
appreciation, then, of their desire for an outlet for thought, his understanding of the 
anxiety of intellectual “impotence” which, I would argue, helped enable so profoundly 
perceptive a critique of their misjudgment.  For if the anti-war “Utopian” intellectual 
must live, as Bourne suggested, with the knowledge that “he is ineffective and that he is 
coerced,” then he can surely understand his peers’ submission to the war and what it 
offered: “the crowning relief of their indecision.”38 
 Ultimately, Bourne was not prepared to yield to the intellectual need for 
“certitude,” for the “dogma to cling to” which, as he knew too well, was of particular aid 
to the intellectual in a period of “danger and disaster.”39  His awareness of the urgency of 
the day, of the need for a vibrant cultural and political criticism to sustain American 
democracy, was troubled by his acknowledgment—which could only have grown in light 
of the historical monster that was the war—of the limits of intellectual action.  On the one 
hand, this limitation was undoubtedly a problem for Bourne; at the same time, his 
awareness of it may have granted him a kind of intellectual liberation, the benefits of the                                                         
     37 Bourne, “Below the Battle,” in War and the Intellectuals, 21. 
     38 Bourne, “A War Diary,” in War and the Intellectuals, 41; “The War and the Intellectuals,” 
11.  Bourne suggested the concern of impotence in “Twilight of Idols,” 58.      
     39 Bourne, “The War and the Intellectuals,” 12. 
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move, in the words of Ross Posnock, to make “creative use of impotence rather than 
merely lamenting it.”  It followed from Bourne’s understanding of the state apparatus that 
the intellectual’s exercise of power or political control was an impossibility, a myth to 
which the war liberals had clung.  The course Bourne charted instead, in the face of the 
impotence that was “socially constituted by the economic demands of the modern 
imperial State,” writes Posnock, was to “turn this very powerlessness into the impetus for 
a constructive skepticism, a ‘robust desperation’ and a ‘heightened energy’ of ‘apathy’ 
that ‘does not dread suspense.’”40 
 That language highlights Bourne’s vision for a different kind of intellectual 
potency, one which resisted both the passivity of total alienation and the corrupting force 
of political power.  In that sense, he was an exemplary figure for the radicals of later 
generations, and prefigured some aspects of the position the dissenters of the 1950s 
would stake out for themselves.  There was a certain empowerment that came with the 
humility of his relationship to history, his ability to resist the impulse which had brought 
other intellectuals to war: “the longing,” as Christopher Lasch calls it, “to commit 
themselves to the onward march of events.” If Bourne indeed became the outsider of 
legend in the memory of so many of his intellectual successors, perhaps it was for this 
reason: his refusal to accept without criticism—even in a time of crisis when the notion 
might have served his psyche well—the allure of mastery, the order of the day.41   
                                                        
     40 Ross Posnock, “The Politics of Pragmatism and the Fortunes of the Public Intellectual,” 
American Literary History 3, no. 3 (1991): 575.  It is important to note, as well, that Posnock 
considers Bourne’s “creative use of impotence” to mark a break from the Jamesian model, or in 
his words, the Jamesian “impasse.”   
     41 Lasch, The New Radicalism, 223.  A brief account of the staying power of Bourne the icon 
after his death appears in Carl Resek’s introduction to War and the Intellectuals, vii-xv.  
However, the notion that the “Bourne legend” as appropriated in the 1920s championed the writer 
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 Despite his early death in 1918, Bourne’s cautionary message was not lost on later 
generations of young intellectuals.42  Not only were the liberals discredited by the failure 
to realize the “progressive” war aims, but Bourne’s elucidation of the dilemma of 
intellectual action rang true for many amidst the fallout of war and the emergence from it 
of a society that was becoming increasingly unrecognizable and distasteful.  It may have 
been in light of Bourne’s confrontation with the intellectual power seekers and his 
articulation of some limitations of the thinker’s force that Harold Stearns found himself 
forced to ask in 1921 what became an iconic question for the period: “What can a young 
man do?”  Writers like Stearns found themselves increasingly isolated, obstructed in the 
pursuit of a more vibrant American culture.  Even where enthusiasm for the life of the 
mind still existed, the sense of promise through action was significantly depleted.  “Of 
course,” wrote Stearns with despair, “our young intellectuals waste much time in 
discovering the hollowness of our institutions; of course their tone is often fretful and 
peevish; of course there are always those to identify freedom with mere running away 
from life and playing like a happy animal.”43       
                                                        
as outcast obscures, as I have suggested above, Bourne’s commitment to public engagement, even 
when in severe dissent from political consensus.  Alfred Kazin also saw Bourne as an exemplary 
figure, one who “must always seem less a writer than the incarnation of his time.”  For Kazin, the 
icon seemed connected not so much to his war dissent, but to his commitment to a progressivism 
erased irrevocably by the war.  “Above all,” he wrote,” Bourne was the perfect child of the 
prewar Enlightenment; when its light went out in 1918, he died with it.”  Alfred Kazin, On Native 
Grounds: An Interpretation of Modern American Prose Literature (New York: Reynal and 
Hitchcock, 1942), 183.   
     42 For an argument for Bourne’s relevance to the contemporary moment, see Robert 
Westbrook, “Bourne Over Baghdad,” Raritan 27, no. 1 (2007): 104-117.  
     43 Harold Stearns, America and the Young Intellectual (New York: George H. Doran 
Company, 1921), 22-23.  Despite his empathy for the resignation of his peers, Stearns longed for 
its reversal.  “Can not we do something,” he wondered in closing the essay “What Can a Young 
Man Do?”, “to make it possible that the answer to the question set forth as the title of this paper 
must not forever be—Get out!”  Stearns, 168.    
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 It might seem curious, then, that in 1930s, many of the trappings of the earlier 
intellectual self-fashioning—proactive commitment and a sense of participation in 
history, for example—would return.  But the onset of the Great Depression, and the 
proliferation of radical visions for the reconstitution of society which gained currency 
among intellectuals in its wake, contributed to the sense that once again, the exigencies of 
the day presented thinkers the opportunity to become actors.  The mood of urgency and 
crisis that Lionel Trilling would later deem formative for the intellectual class seemed to 
supplant any feelings of despair and disenfranchisement retained from the shock of the 
post-World War period and the exile of the 1920s.44      
Still, as Richard Pells explains, the distinction between the decades preceding and 
following the economic collapse of 1929 was not as absolute as later memory would have 
it, precisely because of this sense of intellectual opportunity.  In many respects, Pells 
writes, the Progressive predecessors of the depression generation “provided a symbolic 
union of thought and action whose example the 1930s would try to duplicate in form if 
not in substance.  For the generation of intellectuals who came to maturity during these 
years, the Progressive crusade offered a unique opportunity to influence policy, develop 
and publicize programs appropriate for the new society, and help generate a revolution in 
literary as well as in political life.”45           
                                                        
     44 The classic account of the departure of American intellectuals from their home soil is 
Malcolm Cowley, Exile’s Return: A Literary Odyssey of the 1920s (1934; repr., New York: 
Penguin Books, 1994).  
     45 Richard H. Pells, Radical Visions and American Dreams: Culture and Social Thought in the 
Depression Years (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), 2, 9.  Warren Susman also cautions 
against unchecked assumptions of novelty (particularly on the question of ideology) in the 
periodization of the Thirties.  Warren I. Susman, “The Culture of the Thirties,” in Culture as 
History: The Transformation of American Society in the Twentieth Century (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1984), 150-183.  So too does the problem exist in defining the cultural break between the 
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It is important to note that the opening for participation in the linked cultural and 
political reform of American life encompassed a range of political commitments and 
models of intellectual engagement.  Terry Cooney writes of two camps on the left, each 
with its own understanding of how to proceed with necessary reform.  His scheme is not 
unlike the distinction between the liberal and radical conceptions of progress which I 
have laid out for the 1950s.  On the one hand, he writes, there were those who 
“emphasized the importance of planning, of technical expertise, and social engineering, 
in producing a more just, efficient, orderly, and humane society.”  These thinkers “argued 
for the virtues of a rationalized society managed by experts who would serve the public 
interest.”  Against this group Cooney sets the radicals who were “more attracted to 
visions of conflict and class power, to glorifications of action, to the idea of revolution.”  
These figures were, of course, more attracted to Marxism, and they distrusted the liberal 
models of economy and reform.46   
 It is the latter, more radical contingent, which more frequently comes to bear upon 
the popular imagination of the thirties as the “ideological”—or even further, the “red”—
decade.  There can be little doubt of the feeling of historical certainty which radical 
ideologies provided intellectuals, of the comfort countless writers, critics, and artists took 
from the adoption of a cause.47  In many respects that cause, the enactment of a new 
society, was a “daydream,” as Malcolm Cowley called it in his memoir of the period.                                                          
pre and post-World War I periods; see Henry F. May, The End of American Innocence: A Study 
of the First Years of Our Own Time, 1912-1917 (New York: Knopf, 1959), ix-xiv. 
     46 Terry A. Cooney, Balancing Acts: American Thought and Culture in the 1930s (New York: 
Twayne Publishers, 1995), 10-11.     
     47 This security of ideology did not fuel the adoption of Communism only in the 1930s.  
Whittaker Chambers, an earlier convert, recalled the appeal of Communism as an answer to the 
“crisis of history” and his choice “a choice against death and for life.”  Whittaker Chambers, 
Witness (New York: Random House, 1952), 191-196. 
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But it was one birthed from the uneasy mood of the time and justified by the notion that 
out of crisis came opportunity.  As Cowley put it, amid the collapse of American society 
“there was hope as well, the apocalyptic hope that a City of Man would rise on the other 
side of disaster.”  The conditions of crisis were, for the intellectuals, the conditions of 
possibility.48 
 Such aspirations as Cowley described were not limited to traditional spheres of 
expertise in political or social policy.  Indeed, much of the historiography of intellectual 
life in the 1930s has focused on the attempts by writers and literary critics to align the 
practice of art with the progress of history.49  The contingencies of the decade forced 
writers to consider their function in society; as Richard Pells asks “What did 
‘commitment’ mean for men who had previously supposed that the articulation of ideas 
and the perfection of technique were sufficient in discharging one’s political and moral 
responsibilities?”  The answer, for many, lay in the move towards participation, the belief 
of the writer’s role in history, particularly in the collective struggle to reach utopia.  The 
rapid motion of history compelled the writer to act, to harness his craft to the forces of 
change.  Perhaps writers, disadvantaged as they were by doubts (not just others’ but their 
own as well) about their social worth in a time of crisis, had to adopt an even stronger                                                         
     48 Cowley, The Dream of the Golden Mountains, xii.  Since I am employing memoir here as an 
illustrative source, I should point out that Warren Susman urges us to take stock of the degree to 
which memory has imposed a narrative of ideological commitment on the historiography of the 
1930s.  Still, I believe that the insistence in memoir of the power of ideological commitment and 
the appeal of certainty can be profoundly revealing in and of itself as to the aspirations of 
intellectuals.  See Susman, “The Culture of the Thirties,” 151-153.   
     49 The classic studies of literary radicalism include Daniel Aaron, Writers on the Left: 
Episodes in American Literary Communism (1961; repr., New York: Columbia University, 1992) 
and James Gilbert, Writers and Partisans: A History of Literary Radicalism in America (New 
York: Wiley, 1968).  For a more recent but related work of radical literary production in the 
1930s and 1940s which engages with earlier histories, see Alan Wald, Exiles from a Future Time: 
The Forging of the Mid-Twentieth-Century Literary Left (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2002).   
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confidence in the power of intellectual participation.  They had to believe, once again, in 
the connection between the possibilities of intellectual and national progress.  How the 
two could be realized in tandem was more difficult to answer, but it was a question to be 
postponed.  Whether he realized it or not, Granville Hicks, in his address to the Second 
American Writers Congress of 1937, captured this underlying ambiguity in the adoption 
of historical certainty: “We face the future, hoping—perhaps unreasonably in view of 
what we know about the past—that we can persuade it to let us do our work.”50       
We know that for most believers the sense of possibility did not last.  Radical 
commitment and the belief in intellectuals’ agency were undone in part by the betrayals 
of the Soviet Union, in part by the usurpation of radical action by the perceived success 
of New Deal liberalism.  Nor could the intellectuals point to measurable results in the 
way of social change as a means of credibly demonstrating their own potency; as Richard 
Pells points out, though the crises of the 1930s may have subsided, many (if not most) of 
the problems that the radicals had aimed to address had not.51   
 The problem was only amplified, just as it had been for the previous generation, 
by the deeper uncertainty brought on by world war.  For after 1945, which intellectuals 
could look comfortably upon their relationship to history, their sense of agency in 
shaping the progression of events?  The world made by total war and genocide was one                                                         
     50 Pells, Radical Visions, 152; Granville Hicks, “The American Writer Faces the Future,” in 
The Writer in a Changing World, ed. Henry Hart (New York: Equinox Cooperative Press, 1937), 
182. 
     51 Pells, Radical Visions, 368.  It should also be noted that the sense of participation offered by 
radical ideology was not exclusive to intellectuals.  What’s more, many came to question—and 
rightly so—the degree to which Communist Party leadership had a genuine interest in sustaining 
the leadership of intellectuals.  Richard Hofstadter, writes David Brown, “emerged from the 
thirties permanently alienated from radical politics,” largely because of his belief that 
Communism would ultimately erase the role and freedom of the intellectual.  David S. Brown, 
Richard Hofstadter: An Intellectual Biography (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
2006), 125. 
  31 
of little clarity for intellectuals, even those who had previously pledged their loyalty to 
the cause of defeating fascism.  If the intellectual class was to regain its sense of purpose, 
let alone its sense of authority, it would need reconsider the basis of each in a postwar 
world.  
I will conclude, therefore, with two anecdotal illustrations of this collapse of 
intellectual confidence, both from writers who would continue to play a central role in the 
New York intellectual culture but whose ideas were profoundly informed by the 
experience of depression and war.  The first comes from Dwight Macdonald, whose 
commentary on the transformation of the individual and the state in war sheds particular 
light on the sense of epistemological crisis at the time, and whose message, like Bourne’s 
before it, would haunt later thinkers confronting later wars.52  In the essay “The 
Responsibility of Peoples,” published in 1945, Macdonald described the increasing 
involuntary submission of individuals to larger forces.  “Modern society has become so 
tightly organized, so rationalized and routinized that it has the character of a mechanism 
which grinds on without human consciousness or control,” Macdonald wrote.  “The 
individual, be he ‘leader’ or mass-man, is reduced to powerlessness vis-à-vis the 
mechanism.  More and more, things happen TO people.”  This trend, and the moral 
confusion it engendered—particularly in the wake of mass killings—was not, to be sure, 
discerning of literary or scholastic capacity, and in addition to the designations “leader” 
and “mass-man,” Macdonald might as well have added “thinker.”53 
                                                        
     52 See Noam Chomsky, “The Responsibility of Intellectuals,” The New York Review of Books 
8, no. 3 (1967). 
     53 Dwight Macdonald, “The Responsibility of Peoples,” reprinted in Politics Past: Essays in 
Political Criticism (New York: The Viking Press, 1970), 52. 
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The second illustration comes from Alfred Kazin, who concluded his account of 
the 1930s with an oft-cited scene of doubt: his memory of watching newsreel footage of 
victims of the Nazi death camps at the close of the war.  Implicit in his recollection of the 
“unbearable” shame the footage brought him and his fellow theatergoers was an 
acknowledgment of the overpowering force of contingency, and the feeling of 
helplessness against the rush of events which was a departure, to say the least, from the 
excitement and possibility of the thirties.54    
 Though the stakes were far higher in this case, the sense that Kazin described of 
being left behind by history, of lacking the resources to confront a world made anew and 
unfamiliar, was not unlike his own account of Randolph Bourne’s tragic realization a 
quarter century before: 
He described in terms of his own experience the fate of the progressive 
idealist in a world overrun by war, a world of which the high hopes of 
1910-1917 had given no warning, a world to which reason and art and the 
experimental school alone could give no clue.  He had spent his life 
seeking the American promise as his education had prepared him to 
understand it; and when the war came it seemed to him that his education 
had betrayed him.55 
 
If intellectuals were to proceed with the kind of confidence they had enjoyed in 
the thirties, they would have to find ways to move beyond this new uncertainty, to create 
a space for themselves from which to confront the unique problems of the postwar order.  
And they would have to redefine for themselves the promise of American life and the 
promise of the life of the mind, and to grapple once again with the relationship between 
the two.        
                                                        
     54 Kazin, Starting Out in the Thirties, 166. 
     55 Kazin, On Native Grounds, 185.   
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III. 
 Edmund Wilson’s “Appeal to Progressives,” published in The New Republic in 
January, 1931, was in some sense the first announcement of the challenge the 1930s 
would pose for American intellectuals.  The liberalism of Herbert Croly and his circle, 
Wilson wrote, was no longer capable of serving the needs of the times.  So too, it seemed 
in light of the current crisis, that liberalism’s account of progress was fundamentally 
flawed; those who fancied themselves “progressives” could no longer believe as Croly 
did, Wilson contended, that the “American spirit would be strong enough to compel 
American capitalism to restrain and reform itself.”  What was needed to replace 
liberalism was a “genuine opposition,” a desire to draft new solutions rather than assume 
the validity of old ones—to embrace, to put it one way, the radical over the settled.56  
 Wilson proposed no specific systematic plan of change (he was uncomfortable 
with dogmatic Communism, for one), but his essay is suggestive of the approach that 
many intellectuals took to the crisis of the 1930s.  The quickening collapse of the 
American economy was as much an opportunity as it was a crisis, offering the chance for 
action, for a struggle to implement radical dreams.  As I have suggested in the previous 
chapter, this sense of opportunity must have been seized by the thirties intellectuals in 
part to sustain the feeling of relevance at the very least, or a more authoritative control at 
most.  To some extent, though, in pursuing the kind of participation which supported 
those aspirations, intellectuals lost sight of the very contours of their own social status 
which Wilson himself had considered vital.  On the eve of the Depression, Wilson found 
those limits to the intellectual’s social authority to be crucial, precisely for maintaining                                                         
     56 Edmund Wilson, “Appeal to Progressives,” The New Republic 65, no. 841 (1931): 234-235, 
238. 
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the intellectual’s capacity to critique and to confront real problems.  Wilson’s model 
intellectual was able, in Richard Pells’s words, to “preserve his personal independence, 
critical intelligence, and ethical vision, while at the same time discharging his social 
responsibilities.”57   
 If in the 1930s this model was altered to give way to the committed revolutionary, 
it was perhaps owing to the sustaining nature of urgency and crisis for intellectuals; to 
respond to crisis, to participate at the forefront of history, was at once an act of political 
realization and self-legitimization.58  By the 1950s, however, such an opportunity was no 
longer available.  Despite the uncertainties of the postwar atmosphere, there was no 
Writers’ Congress, no Popular Front, no clearly accessible outlet for intellectual energy.   
 We can view the 1952 Partisan Review symposium on “Our Country and Our 
Culture” as one site—indeed, I would argue, the most fertile site—in which intellectuals 
struggled to define their practice in light of this development, to articulate the impact the 
new order would have on intellectual virtues and responsibilities.  For some, the absence 
of a crisis on the scale of the Depression was a welcome relief; the climate of crisis had 
given way to economic stability and the comfort—albeit menaced by Soviet opposition—
of American military strength.  This was not necessarily the nation that liberal 
intellectuals had envisioned, but it was one in which they could live, and more 
importantly, one in which they could continue their craft.  The freedom of postwar 
America was at once to be applauded and defended; it would open up new avenues of 
intellectual participation in national life. 
                                                        
     57 Richard H. Pells, Radical Visions, 41-42. 
     58 See my opening discussion in the previous chapter, on Trilling’s view of the intellectual 
style forged in the Thirties.
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 At the same time, the more radical participants in the symposium doubted the 
degree of prosperity in postwar life, and were not eager to settle in to a culture of stability 
regardless; nor were they prepared to accept that the new role of the American 
intellectual was to fight the Cold War.  For this group, Edmund Wilson’s portrait of the 
intellectual as engaged, but from a critical and independent position, was still of great 
use.  This model of a kind of robust dissent offered radical intellectuals a new self-
justification, even in the absence of a large-scale external crisis; it informed the radicals’ 
efforts to undermine both the image of a more inviting postwar society as well as the 
notion that to be included or comfortable in society as such was in fact a virtue for 
intellectuals at all. 
 The contributions to the 1952 symposium, then, were a set of attempts for 
intellectuals to find new forms of meaning, new virtues to cling to in a moment which 
seemed to lack the sense of historical urgency which marked previous intellectual 
experiences.  It is the dialogue between particular strain of responses that stressed the 
Cold War responsibilities of intellectuals, and those that maintained the necessity—and 
potency—of dissent, which I believe best captures this search for meaning.  Each strain, I 
take it as my presumption, was formed at least in part with an eye towards combating the 
anxiety of irrelevance, which in this period stemmed more from concerns about the 
intellectual’s role in history than from the sense that the country was anti-intellectual.  
For that reason, I seek to reorient the story of 1952 away from the intellectuals’ supposed 
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quarrel with America or American culture towards the intellectuals’ quarrel with 
themselves.59  
 To be sure, to cast the discourse as a debate between patriotic and unpatriotic 
intellectuals is to misunderstand—or deliberately mischaracterize—the position of the 
dissenters.  Neither a distrust of conformity and a belief in the importance of skeptical 
thought necessitated or even suggested a disavowal of national affiliation.  We should 
recall the degree to which, in the 1930s, even the most radical critics of capitalism 
themselves were committed to the notion of an American exploration, particularly in the 
move to document Great Depression society.  These writers were driven by a new kind of 
nationalism, as Alfred Kazin put it, “the urge born of the crisis to recover America as an 
idea.”60      
The memory of this impulse within American literary radicalism is crucial in the 
face of any effort to equate dissent with rejecting wholeheartedly an American cultural 
tradition.  Take, for example, Norman Podhoretz’s recent estimation of the great cultural 
output which the so-called “discovery” of American had spawned in the 1950s.  Since, 
for Podhoretz, the embrace of that “discovery” stood in opposition to the dissent of the 
radicals, it follows that to resist conformity in 1952 was at once to dismiss the value of 
1950s literature as Podhoretz sees it.  It need hardly be said that such was not the case;                                                         
     59 My choice to focus on the contentious discourse of intellectual virtuous does come at the 
expense of charting the particular criticisms of American mass culture.  The two subjects were of 
course linked, not least in the 1952 symposium.  George Cotkin convincingly connects the 
challenge of self-definition for postwar intellectuals with the anxiety associated with the growth 
of mass culture.  George Cotkin, “The Tragic Predicament: Post-war American Intellectuals, 
Acceptance and Mass Culture,” in Intellectuals in Politics: From the Dreyfus Affair to Salman 
Rushdie, ed. Jeremy Jennings and Anthony Kemp-Welch (New York: Routledge, 2001), 249-250.   
     60 Kazin, On Native Grounds, 489.  On the documentary impulse of the 1930s, see for 
example, Pells, Radical Visions, 194-201; Peter Conn also notes the degree to which that impulse 
was an excavation of the American past, in The American 1930s: A Literary History (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
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Podhoretz collapsed the distinction between a cultural affiliation that utilized national 
resources for aesthetic exploration, and accommodation to the American political scene 
of the day.61  As Irving Howe wrote in his symposium response, “Instead of assuming 
that America is a person whom one must marry or divorce, embrace in ecstasy or trample 
in scorn, I prefer to distinguish among aspects of its behavior and tradition.”62 
 Despite Podhoretz’s conservative revisionism, some of the liberal voices in 1952 
did in fact acknowledge, and even emphasize, the recovery of an American tradition in 
the 1930s.  Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. contended that the twin shocks of depression and the 
rise of fascism sent intellectuals at that time looking for “ground to stand on,” and that 
they found it in American foundations.  In Jacques Barzun’s view, the mode of 
participation in the 1930s—particularly for writers involved in WPA programs—birthed 
a surprising new “sense of solidarity—with on another as well as with their birthplace.”  
The development of this collective sensibility, he continued, made intellectuals appreciate 
a new and in his view, particularly American condition: “the get-together, corn-husking 
democracy of mutual help.”63 
 To make good republicans out of intellectuals was not, however, the effect of the 
native explorations in depression culture; nor was the account of intellectual acculturation 
which had its roots in the experience of the 1930s and early 1940s a purely objective 
historical one.  Indeed, this version of history had currency for those liberals who sought 
                                                        
     61 Norman Podhoretz, “Intellectuals and Writers Then and Now,” Partisan Review 69, no. 4 
(2002): 507-509.  Despite the fact that Ellison rejected the imposition of politics on his writing, 
few would argue that his work embraces the American landscape of the 1950s without reservation 
or criticism.     
     62 Irving Howe, “Our Country and Our Culture,” 56.   
     63 Arthur Schlesinger, “Our Country and Our Culture,” 101 Jacques Barzun, “Our Country and 
Our Culture,” 14. 
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to normalize the premise of the symposium, that intellectuals had fundamentally revised 
their stance towards their country.  The argument implied that such a new stance was a 
natural outgrowth of trends beyond the intellectual’s control; that such a position was 
mutually beneficial for intellectuals and the rest of society; and that to participate as a 
“working part of the nation” (Barzun’s words) was fully commensurate with the 
intellectual’s own sense of personal responsibility.64    
 These claims did not indicate a reactionary requirement of nationalism among 
intellectuals, but they did impose upon dissenters a rather rigid definition of participation 
in national progress.  The projects identified by Schlesinger and Barzun as having drawn 
intellectuals into national culture—rehabilitating the economy, winning the battle against 
fascism—were struggles with which radicals themselves were aligned, ones which even, 
as I have suggested in the previous chapter, bestowed an appealing sense of authority 
upon intellectuals.65  But these efforts were ultimately ones with which there could be no 
quarrel.  Therefore, to commit to the collective American progress seemed to entail a 
moral imperative, a forced consensus which left little room for the role of the dissenting 
critic in future efforts.  Taken to its extreme, this imposition could have a smoothing 
effect on intellectual expression, similar to what Richard Pells notes occurred with the 
onset of the Second World War.  The engagement with external enemies was a “relief,” 
he writes, not just for its empowerment of intellectuals, but for its perceived potential to                                                         
     64 Barzun, “Our Country,” 14. 
     65 George Cotkin places Schlesinger, for one, in the tradition of William James and the pursuit 
of a “strenuous, non-utopian engagement with domestic and foreign problems.”  Schlesinger, 
Cotkin goes on, recognized the need for this strenuous engagement in combating political 
extremism, in his articulation of the “vital center.”  George Cotkin, “William James and the 
Strenuous Responsibility of the Liberal Intellectual,” in The Liberal Persuasion: Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr., and the Challenge of the American Past, ed. John Patrick Diggins (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1997), 264, 273-274  
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“cleanse the atmosphere of all the ideological disputes and social disappointments that 
had characterized the waning years of the depression.”66 
 The liberal model of intellectual acculturation presumed, further, that 
cosmopolitanism was an undesirable trait.  Granted, Howe and other radicals accepted 
their American identity not just as a de facto condition but as one with a cultural heritage 
upon which to draw when suitable.  However, Howe too saw a connection between the 
resistance to setting “roots” and the preservation of critical dissent: “Almost always,” he 
wrote two years after the symposium, “the talk one hears these days about ‘the need for 
roots’ veils a desire to compromise the tradition of intellectual independence, to seek in a 
nation or religion or party a substitute for the tenacity one should find in oneself.”  There 
was something to be said, in other words, for rejecting the reliance on parochial 
identification as a means of resisting the erosion of critical faculties.  This argument, we 
will see, carried much weight for the champions of dissent.67 
 However, the choice for national identity was one which the liberals made to 
seem both inevitable and crucial.  Indeed, even while maintaining the value of what 
Partisan Review’s editors termed “critical non-conformity”—particularly in the critique 
of mass culture—the liberals saw the adoption of the American homeland as the 
necessary result of the Second World War, the breakdown of European civilization, and 
the rise of Communism.  These developments had brought the United States to a position 
of cultural and political primacy, “the protector of Western civilization,” so the premise 
                                                        
     66 Pells, Radical Visions, 363-364.   
     67 Irving Howe, “This Age of Conformity,” Partisan Review 21, no. 1 (1954): 14-15.  For 
more on the concept of “rootlessness” and the problem of cosmopolitanism for intellectuals, see 
Ross Posnock, “How It Feels to Be a Problem: Du Bois, Fanon, and the ‘Impossible Life’ of the 
Black Intellectual,” Critical Inquiry 23, no. 2 (1997): 323-349. 
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of the symposium went.  “For the first time in the history of the modern American 
intellectual,” wrote Lionel Trilling, “America is not to be conceived of as a priori the 
vulgarest and stupidest nation of the world.”  This position was not merely achieved by 
default, argued Barzun, but rather: “Countless deeds of valor, or organized brawn, and of 
intellect, showed that the nation as a whole could act and learn and achieve; so that it was 
no disgrace, no provincialism, to accept America and admire it.”68   
 With the protection of Western culture came the protection of political and 
intellectual freedom as well; surely this, the liberals contended, should be enough to sway 
for the nation to gain the trust and loyalty of the intellectuals.  America had thus become 
a country not only receptive to the practice of intellect, but also the only viable 
environment in which to sustain that practice.  And to consider the question of what 
constituted intellectual life, then, was made easier by the simple realization that the basis 
of that life was in jeopardy.  “The task of the intellectual,” Sidney Hook asserted, “is still 
to lead an intellectual life, to criticize what needs to be criticized in America, without 
forgetting for a moment the total threat which Communism poses to the life of the free 
mind.”  It was clear to him, therefore, that the contribution of criticism to American 
society must not be separated from the concurrent defense of that society when it faced 
existential threat.69             
                                                        
     68 Lionel Trilling, “Our Country and Our Culture,” 111; Barzun, “Our Country,” 14. 
     69 Sidney Hook, “Our Country and Our Culture,” 50.  Arthur Schlesinger posed the matter in 
slightly different terms, when he wrote: “Tocqueville could not have been more right; political 
freedom is the indispensable preliminary to any effective defense against the leveling of culture.”  
Thus the protection of intellectual freedom (not only from Soviet Communism, Schlesinger 
pointed out, but from McCarthyism as well) was the principle condition which the other essential 
duties of the intellectual, including serious cultural critique.  Schlesinger, “Our Country,” 103. 
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Hook’s contribution to the symposium offered perhaps the most explicit statement 
of what I have been calling the liberal answer to the question of intellectual virtues.  That 
is to say, he made clear what he and others saw to be the inextricable link between the 
preservation of the intellectual life and the preservation of American freedom.  The 
“new” American intellectual recognized his role in adopting the Cold War imperative; if 
there were any previously, his primary pursuit became action rather than contemplation, 
the support rather than the scrutiny of definitive moral categories.  This imperative was 
no more a threat to intellectuals than to people in any other mode of life, argued Hook, 
but the critical capacity should have led intellectuals to recognize it and embrace it with 
more rapidity and more certainty.  As forceful as it was, Hook’s articulation looks benign 
in light of Lionel Trilling’s earlier assertion of the Cold War’s existential stakes:  
We are people who believe that our very existence is defined by our 
freedom to think and speak as we choose and, in the arts, to make what we 
choose.  And so the extreme limitation of that freedom by a human agency 
does not appear to us merely as the curtailment of a right—it appears as 
nothing less than annihilation. 
 
It is unclear whether Trilling here intended to address his professional peers or the 
Americans people writ large, but regardless, the implication for the hierarchy of 
intellectual responsibilities was the same.  It was impossible to conceive of defining 
intellectual virtues, it seemed, without recognizing that the first condition to be preserved 
was intellectual freedom itself.70 
                                                        
     70 Hook, “Our Country,” 46.  I would suggest that it was this kind of assumption about the 
Cold War which led even a figure as independent and subversive as Dwight Macdonald to reject 
the pointed neutrality of the past and “choose the West.”  As Macdonald wrote in that famous 
expression, delivered in the same year as “Our Country and Our Culture,” the struggle between 
Western democracy and Communism was a “fight to the death between radically different 
cultures.”  Macdonald held this position despite painting a less romantic picture of Western 
freedom than some others.  Dwight Macdonald, “I Choose the West,” in Politics Past, 198.   
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The severity of such rhetoric highlights the crucial challenge that the Cold War 
liberal framework posed to dissenters from the symposium’s claims.  The threat to free 
thought, and the proposition that an intellectual found himself without the choice but to 
defend it, indicated that intellectual life in America was once again to be defined by the 
mode of urgency to which thinkers had flocked with ease in the past.  Once again an 
external conflict penetrated the center of intellectual life, a new crisis to which intellect 
was to be mobilized.  Such mobilization was, as we know, considerably alluring to the 
active mind; it suggested that radicals would have to defend not only the merits of dissent 
as a virtue, but as a means of intellectual potency.  
 The chief critic of the consensus of 1952, and thus the most vocal of radical 
dissenters, was Irving Howe.  While several others were dissatisfied with the 
symposium’s proposition of an intellectual reconciliation with national culture and 
argued for the maintenance of the intellectual’s critical responsibilities, none presented as 
forceful a case as Howe against the submission to, or worse, the embrace, of conformity.  
Howe’s critique, begun in 1952 with “Our Country and Our Culture” but expanded more 
forcefully in the following years, not only reflects an unwillingness to bend the creative 
and constructive powers of intellect to consensus or the service of power, but also a 
refusal to accept the imposition of the Cold War on the intellectual’s self-definition as put 
forth by some of his liberal contemporaries.71 
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 Howe did acknowledge, in his contribution to the symposium, that the threat of 
totalitarianism warranted the defense of democracy by even the “socialist intellectual.”  
However, he was quick to note, the intellectual was to take up that task “while 
maintaining his independence from and opposition to the status quo.”72 The juxtaposition 
of these two responsibilities is crucial, as it immediately distinguishes Howe’s position 
from that of the liberals I have examined above.  Howe could recognize the threat to 
intellectual freedom as did Hook, for example, but did not need to subordinate all other 
concerns to it.  Nor did he accept the premise that the practice of intellect, at least his 
practice, could be subsumed into the Cold War binary.  This resistance was in some sense 
similar to his rejection of the notion that the intellectual could be classified as either 
amenable or adversarial to “American life.”  In either case, the imposition of categories to 
which the intellectual was to attach himself eroded the adherence to nuance and the 
preservation of a critical perspective.73  
 In addition, Howe rejected the notion that American culture—as Trilling claimed 
in his essay—had undergone a noticeable maturation.  The spirit of the twenties or 
thirties had not been met or surpassed by contemporary writers, wrote Howe, a fact which 
helped undermine the notion that the new “closeness” to American culture had 
reinvigorated the literary sphere.  Such skepticism of the cultural benefits of intellectual 
accommodation was tied to Howe’s doubt that “high” or “serious” culture in general was 
gaining a foothold in postwar America.  Questioning the evidence of such a development,                                                         
American Life (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), 395; Irving Howe, “The New York 
Intellectuals,” 257; John Patrick Diggins, The Proud Decades: America in War and Peace, 1941-
1960 (New York: W.W.Norton and Company, 1988), 266. 
     72 Irving Howe, “Our Country and Our Culture,” 53. 
     73 Howe, “Our Country,” 56. 
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Howe argued that instead the popular was outpacing the high-brow, and that the serious 
was being co-opted by the demands of the market.74 
 Specifically, he attacked the “recent effort of academic critics to house-break our 
great writers,” a move which reduced Melville and Hawthorne from challenging figures 
to recognizable middle-class types.  Indeed, the corruption of literary criticism was of 
particular concern, both for what it said about the decline of American culture and about 
the erosion of the role of the critic.  What could be more egregious a dereliction of 
intellectual duty than to sterilize the rich sources of American literary tradition?  The 
critics to whom Howe was referring had, in a sense, erased the very conflicts and crises 
which Howe saw as the source of intellectual strength.  The problem persisted and 
continued to preoccupy Howe in the years to come: in 1956, he wrote an essay attacking 
the portrayal Orwell as a “moderate hero” by one English biographer.  The heroic Orwell, 
Howe claimed, demanded not a conventional narrative but rather an account that traced 
“the series of moral and intellectual crises, the painful confrontations of a man who was 
driven to plunge into every vortex of misery or injustice that the saw, yet had an obvious 
distaste for the trumpery of modern politics.”  The figure depicted otherwise, through a 
narrative which ignored such crises, “was not the one, he could not have been the one, 
who wrote 1984,” Howe contended.75  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 That review, especially in light of Howe’s “Our Country and Our Culture” essay, 
recalls the argument of another key dissenter from 1952, Norman Mailer.  While Mailer 
did not precisely share Howe’s cultural politics, nor his style of public presentation, he 
did share a concern that the new model of intellectual affirmation caused American 
culture to contract rather than expand, to become duller and more passive.  “Where the 
fifties theorized about totalitarianism in far-off places,” Morris Dickstein writes, “Mailer 
found a creeping totalitarianism here at home, ‘a slow death by conformity,’ he said, 
“’with every creative and rebellious instinct stifled.’”  The artist’s role, then, in Mailer’s 
eyes was one of fixed historical significance: he bore the responsibility for combating the 
stifling trend of accommodation.   “It is the artist,” he wrote in 1955, “embodying the 
most noble faculty of man—his urge to rebel—who his forever enlarging the walls.”76 
  In 1952, while accepting the claim that a widespread intellectual reorientation had 
taken place, Mailer nevertheless denied, as had Howe, that the resulting national 
sensibility had produced great literature.  With respect to the once-honored authors of the 
previous generation and their collective turn from “alienation to varying degrees of 
acceptance, if not outright proselytizing, for the American Century,” Mailer pondered 
rhetorically: “Dare one mention that their work since the Second World War has been 
singularly barren and flatulent?”  We should take this bit of audacious criticism as 
evidence of the parallel between Mailer and Howe: if for Howe the stand against 
conformity was a defense of intellectual virtue, then for Mailer it was a defense of artistic                                                         
academicism, mystifications, and reaction noted here; and that is the politics of intellectual 
criticism, secular intransigence, devotion to radical and scientific values, and a refusal to raise the 
flags of power.  This minimum ground may be the price of survival.  To say no—is that really so 
hard?” Howe, “Magazine Chronicle,” 427. 
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virtue.  Efforts at integration or ingratiation on the part of the writer were likely to worsen 
his craft; Mailer’s proposition that “the artist feels most alienated when he loses the sharp 
sense of what he is alienated from” rendered alienation as a source of inspiration, not 
disengagement or impotence.77 
  What’s more, both Mailer and Howe, in envisioning the artistic and intellectual 
life, shared a disdain for the static, the drying up of literary and intellectual output (what 
Mailer called the “barren and flatulent” literature) that stemmed from the acceptance of 
consensual culture and politics by writers and thinkers in the fifties.  Mailer noted that the 
dominant intellectual discourse lacked discussion of troublesome issues such as modern 
war and the continuing crisis of capitalism.  Presumably this impoverished discourse was 
the result of intellectual exhaustion, what Howe referred to as “the readiness of certain 
intellectuals to make their peace or strike a truce with the status quo”—the same 
readiness which led to the affirmations of American identity.78 
The dissent pronounced by Howe and Mailer was, in contrast to such stasis, a 
constructive force of political and cultural opposition.  That is, the practice of dissent was 
governed by the impulse to challenge rather than negate, by the attempt to bring a gaze to 
bear on the status quo with the goal of achieving constructive but radical progress 
(specifically for Howe, democratic socialism).  In the inaugural editorial statement for 
Dissent magazine, which Howe founded in 1954 as an organ of intellectual activity in 
opposition to the increasing conformity of Partisan Review or Commentary, he sought to 
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highlight this constructive strand of criticism.  “Dissent would be meaningless,” Howe 
and the editors noted from the beginning, “if in dissenting it did not also affirm.”79     
I have chosen to employ the word constructive here in order to draw out Howe’s 
vision of dissent as a program, not merely a defensive posture.  It is true that to a certain 
extent, the impositions of fifties culture may have inspired a defensive posture on the part 
of radical intellectuals like Howe.  But even in light of such forces as McCarthyism and 
the professionalization of intellect, Howe’s insistence on dissent as an intellectual virtue 
carries great weight on its own terms.  Articulated as a means of intellectual practice, 
dissent could provide intellectuals with a sense of security against the anxiety of 
irrelevance.  To be precise, the dissenter of the early 1950s sought to operate directly in 
contrast to what Jacques Barzun denounced as the intellectual insistence on “hating the 
present day.”  The practice of dissent cast the intellectual as a contributor rather than a 
subversive, an active participant in cultural and political conflict rather than a withdrawn 
malcontent.80  
Just as Howe was conscious of the problem of self-justification for intellectuals, 
and took measures to formulate a vision of intellectual life that could combat it, he also 
knew that his model of dissent opposed another avenue of relief from the anxiety of 
irrelevance: the embrace of wealth, power, and institutional security.  In the 1954 essay 
“This Age of Conformity,” Howe revisited his attack on the accommodation of the 
intellectuals from 1952, amplifying his critique of the embrace of power.  The                                                         
     79 “A Word to Our Readers,” Dissent 1, no. 1 (1954): 4.  Mailer served as contributing editor 
to Dissent, and later noted his appreciation of Howe’s “first-rate” polemical writing, as well as for 
the opportunities the new kind of magazine afforded him.  See Mailer, Advertisements for Myself 
(New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1959), 186. 
     80 Jacques Barzun, God’s Country and Mine: A Declaration of Love Spiced With a Few Harsh 
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abandonment of the goal of an intellectual life free from the aspirations of “commercial 
civilization,” argued Howe, signaled the submission of the independent and engaged 
intellectual to larger structures of power.  This move was dangerous, as Howe noted, 
because “The institutional world needs intellectuals because they are intellectuals but it 
does not want them as intellectuals.”  In other words, to accommodate or serve 
institutional authority was to fundamentally co-opt the critical functions of intellect.81 
This was not a new argument, but it carried more urgency in the 1950s than it had 
for previous generations of intellectuals.  As the convergence of intellectual 
professionalization and the reification of Cold War ideology inaugurated what Morris 
Dickstein calls the “reign of the expert and whiz-kid” in the halls of power, Irving 
Howe’s dissent appeared to remain a humble outlier among the models of intellectual 
engagement.82  Howe, though, had not abandoned the notion that the intellectual could be 
a positive actor; this belief he shared with the ascendant technocrats and planners.  The 
difference between the two, however, lay in the stakes associated with trying to realize 
that belief.  Needless to say, an intellectual misjudgment on Howe’s part, or a false 
estimation of his own agency in shaping events, would not bring wide-reaching 
consequences.  American society, in other words, could afford the errors of his 




     81 Howe, “This Age of Conformity,” 11, 13.  For a discussion of the connection between the 
institutionalization of intellectuals and the fear of their irrelevance, see Russell Jacoby, The Last 
Intellectuals, 72-78. 
     82 Dickstein, Gates of Eden, 61. 
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IV. 
 As he sought to assess the aspirations and anxieties of the intellectual class in 
1962, Richard Hofstadter announced the central quandary which seemed to plague 
thinking men of uncertain commitment.  “It appears to be the fate of intellectuals,” 
Hofstadter wrote, “either to berate their exclusion from wealth, success, and reputation, 
or to be seized by guilt when they overcome this exclusion.  They are troubled, for 
example, when power disregards the counsels of intellect, but because they fear 
corruption they are even more troubled when power comes to intellect for counsel.”83 
 Irving Howe did not fit in neatly with this scheme.  Drawing on a model of 
intellectual virtue which deployed a robust critique of power along with a radical model 
of social progress, Howe was able to transcend the tenuous position which Hofstadter 
described.  His warning against the allure of power for intellectuals in the 1950s was, 
moreover, proven prescient by the developments of subsequent decades.  The most 
powerless intellectuals of all, Howe had contended, were those “who attach themselves to 
the seats of power, where they surrender their freedom of expression without gaining any 
significance as political figures.”84  Consider the striking similarity between that 
assertion, delivered in 1954, and Christopher Lasch’s critique of the Cold War liberals of 
the Congress for Cultural Freedom.  In light of the revelation of CIA influence in the 
organization, Lasch wrote that: 
In associating themselves with the war-making and propaganda machinery of the 
state in the hope of influencing it, intellectuals deprive themselves of the real 
influence they could have as men who refuse to judge the validity of ideas by the 
requirements of national power or other entrenched interest.  Time after time in  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this century it has been shown that the dream of influencing the war machine is a 
delusion.  The war machine cannot be influenced by the advice of well-meaning 
intellectuals in the inner councils of government; it can only be resisted.85 
 
The liberals of “Our Country and Our Culture” and their cohort did not explicitly 
call for the service of power as a means of realizing intellectual fulfillment or national 
commitment.  However, to place the Cold War at the center of American intellectual life 
had its consequences for the independence of thought and intellectual action on which 
most liberals seemed to place a high value.  The farce of their experience in the service of 
national power, and its amplification in subsequent decades with the rise of the so-called 
“defense intellectuals” (first liberal, then conservative), should caution us to check any 
future confidence we may have in our ability to mobilize knowledge to the cause of the 
state.  
At the same time, the consequences of the intellectual engagement with power 
should cause us to rethink what so many intellectuals (and indeed this essay itself) 
presumed to be a crucial aim of intellectual life itself: to find a home.  As we have seen, 
the search for national affiliation was not simply what Van Wyck Brooks sought in the 
1930s, the recovery of an American past as a resource for literary and critical 
production.86  It was instead the search for an outlet for intellectual practice, for an 
opportunity to shape history.  The “discovery” of America, then, which Norman 
Podhoretz and many of his comrades lauded in the postwar period, was perhaps an 
opening for the pursuit of authority.  To be welcomed by American society, by this logic, 
was perhaps to assume that one had been given an invitation to lead it.  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Too many intellectuals in the twentieth century, however, were more interested in 
controlling history than they were in studying it.  For to take stock of history would be to 
appreciate the limits of the power of the individual, particularly of the individual who 
believes his ideas can command the actions of others.  This was a fact consistently 
disregarded by war-mongerers masquerading as men and women of vision; instead of 
ideas, these men and women have been governed by what Malcolm Cowley termed the 
“daydream”.  It would be a grave mistake for us to give them yet another chance to find 
their daydream interrupted by historical contingency.   
Still, there is a role for the dreamer in our society, if not in the halls of power.  In 
our own time of crisis, the appeal of radical visions remains, as does an appreciation for 
those who have tried to realize them.  I find myself in sympathy with the words that 
Daniel Aaron wrote in 1961, at the conclusion of his own study of writers who found 
themselves confounded by the rush of history, desperately trying to take hold of it: 
We who precariously survive in the sixties can regret their inadequacies and 
failures, their romanticism, their capacity for self-deception, their shrillness, their 
self-righteousness.  It is less easy to scorn their efforts, however blundering and 
ineffective, to change the world.87   
 
 A more humble dream, or a more restrained conception of the promise of 
intellectual life—one that engages the wider public, to be sure—may be what we will 
need to restore and expand the promise of American life.  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